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aggregation and relationships between retailers/aggregators and the districts in which DR resources are 23 situated. Given this motivation, this paper introduces a novel and powerful 'transactive energy' modelling and 24 assessment framework for DMES. The framework includes: a DMES stochastic optimisation model with a 25 flexible and scalable approach for modelling aggregation useful for both technical and economic analysis; a 26 modular and extensible value mapping methodology for identifying transactive energy price signals and cash 27 flows for different energy system actors; a profit sharing model; and an economic assessment model based on 28 fundamental cost-benefit analysis. The framework is illustrated through analysis of DR business cases on a real 29 district in France. 
Introduction

42
Legislative efforts to increase the sustainability of energy systems (by reducing emissions), combined with 43 constant consumer pressure to minimise costs and expectations of high levels of reliability are leading to 44 several broad trends. Firstly the penetration of variable, non-dispatchable renewable energy sources (RES) 45 (utility-scale and distributed) and electric heating and transport are increasing. These trends produce two 1 countervailing further trends, i.e., increased demand for flexibility, but also an increase in technologies capable 2 of supplying flexibility. Demand for flexibility is expected to rise as network/system issues increase. More RES 3 will increase variability and uncertainty in system operation, thereby increasing the requirement for balancing 4 services; at the same time, the business cases for traditional providers of such services (flexible generation) 5 will be eroded [1, 2] . Further, increased and bi-directional electricity flows at the distribution level can produce 6 thermal and voltage issues at the district level [3, 4] . At the same time, greater electrification of heating and 7 transport as well as increased penetration of smart grid technologies in local RES (e.g., photovoltaic inverters) 8 will contribute to a trend for distributed multi-energy systems (DMES) to potentially provide flexibility via 9 demand response (DR). DR from DMES can be understood as being derived from several factors, namely, 10 storage, substitution, curtailment and power factor correction [5, 6] . Utilising a multi-energy view [7] , storage 11 may be of electricity, or some derived energy vector/product, such as heat, and substitution may be of one 12 fuel for another (e.g., electricity for fuel oil), to produce the same final product (e.g., mobility). Curtailment 13 may relate to some energy service, such as thermal comfort [8, 9] , whilst power factor correction (of a building, 14 or a district) may be enacted by some power electronic interface (e.g., from a battery or solar photovoltaic 15 connection) [6] . Clearly increased electrification of transport and heating, together with developments in 16 information and communication technology (ICT) and exploitation of multi-energy resources will result in more 17 opportunities to provide DR from DMES [6, [10] [11] [12] [13] . 18
Although flexibility from these DMES (e.g., districts or community based energy systems) may be considered 19 more attractive than other sources of flexibility (given their location on distribution networks, which 20 introduces the possibility of providing local services) there are multiple and various barriers facing such new 21 players in the developing "smart grid" [14, 15] . Focusing on districts (which are a special case of DMES and 22 which, when augmented with appropriate technologies, may be considered a component of larger "smart" 23 constructs, such as cities [7] ) a key barrier is the lack of appropriate techno-economic models. Modelling and 24 assessment of DR from such "smart energy districts" requires a holistic framework, covering both physical and 25 commercial aspects. On the physical side, models must capture the multiple sources of (multi-energy) 26 flexibility which can be exploited [8, 16] . Given the importance of physical and virtual (commercial) aggregation 27 with respect to heat, as well as gas and electricity, the framework should allow for modelling of various 28 permutations of aggregation arrangements. Given the complexity of optimisation problem formulation, 29 especially if a stochastic optimisation is being employed with many sources of storage, such a method should 30 be flexible and scalable. On the commercial side there is then a requirement for methods which can 31 breakdown the complexity of DR business cases (covering energy, capacity, or flexibility services [17] ) and 32 highly networked energy systems. Such complexity may be even more significant if costs related to DR exercise 33 need to be shared [18] [19] [20] . Further, connections can be expected to increase between markets for 34 substitutable energy vectors and fuels in a multi-energy context [7, [21] [22] [23] . Understanding and modelling this 35 complexity has been identified as a priority by both regulatory bodies and academics [24] [25] [26] . 36
Another necessary feature for a smart energy district modelling and assessment framework is the ability to 37 model methods for sharing the benefits of flexibility exploitation between district consumers and their 38 commercial partner (e.g., aggregator or retailer). In the existing literature a qualitative examination of how 39 benefits from 'co-provision' (by consumers, as well as energy retailers/energy service companies) of energy or 40 energy services may be shared between relevant actors has been undertaken in [27, 28] . For smart districts 41 the provision of flexibility services to upstream parties must also be considered. In this regard, theoretical and 42 practical attention has been given to methods for controlling/coordinating prosumers, ranging from direct load 43 control, to coordination via price signals (from national and local energy markets) [29, 30] . Some of these 44 approaches (i.e., game theory based approaches) consider how benefits should be shared amongst consumers 45 and (in some cases) an aggregator party [29] . These approaches draw on the rich field of game theory [31] and 46 can ensure a 'fair' distribution of benefits. However, this comes at the price of great complexity and requires 47 significant communication and computation capabilities within the district. Detailing of further quantitative 48 methods for sharing benefits from exploitation of flexibility will therefore be beneficial. This is particularly true 1 if consumers do not wish to adopt the technology required for them to act as the autonomous intelligent 2 agents required for game theoretic approaches. Our work thus proposes a novel approach that bridges the 3 existing gaps while at the same time being practical and of straightforward applicability without adding 4 technology and communication complexity. 5
Thus there is clearly a need for more quantitative methods for sharing benefits of flexibility exploitation 6 between DR providers (consumers) and their commercial agents. Such methods warrant consideration given 7 the fundamentally different nature of flexibility exploitation business cases to energy service provision 8 business cases, as the former may, for example, often increase energy consumption, as flexibility is employed 9 to import and store energy at lower price periods, incurring storage losses (see Section 4.3). 10
In this paper, addressing the deficits identified above modelling and assessment framework for smart DMES, 11 with specific application to the particularly important case of smart districts, is presented. The framework 12 follows a transactive energy based approach. Following the definition of the GridWise Architectural Council, 13 we define transactive energy as "a set of economic and control mechanisms that allow the dynamic balance of 14 supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using value as a key operational parameter" [32] . 15
The approach is ideally suited given that smart DMES are subject to multiple markets/mechanisms. Figure 2 , for electricity and heat, relationships between the various physical and commercial 4 aspects are dictated by the different mapping matrices. With respect to the commercial aspects this is a 5 generalisation of the approach taken in [33] where only many-to-one or many-to-many mappings were 6 considered. With respect to the physical aspects, the framework introduced here explicitly features multi-7 energy demand, multi-energy storage and conversion devices. Heat network connections within the DMES are 8 modelled, in a simplified way (without considering network dynamics and constraints), through the mappings 9 between conversion, storage and demand. The local electricity network is modelled (again in a simplified way, 10 considering public or private ownership of local electricity networks) by the mapping between GCPs and 11 'networks'. Gas is another vector often relevant, but not shown here for brevity. 12 , maps demand to storage, , maps storage to conversion, , maps conversion to premises, 15
, maps premises to GCPs, and , and , map GCPs to commercial agents and local networks, 16
respectively. In the aggregation and optimisation model these matrices are used in two ways, dependent on 17 whether the relationship between aspects is exclusive or not. Mappings , and , define non-exclusive 18 relationships. This allows, for example, an electricity-heat converter connected to a heat network to supply 19 many thermal energy stores (TES), and a TES to supply many demands. Considering the relationship between 20 demand and storage, equations (1) and (2) (
Mappings , , , , , and , define exclusive relationships, as heat generators can only be located in 26 one premises, premises can only be connected to one GCP etc. Below equation (3) shows the relationship 27 between premises import/export ( ) and GCP import/export ( ), for each scenario and time step. Similar 28 relationships can be defined using each of the exclusive mappings shown in Figure 2 . 29
The key benefits of the mapping approach adopted are its flexibility and scalability, particularly to simplified 30 local network modelling. However, it should be noted that for full consideration of losses and capacity, 31
voltage, pressure and flow constraints, at cost of substantial extra complexity, network modelling should also 32 be incorporated [35, 36] . 33
Based on the mappings an optimisation model for the DMES under study can be built. As mentioned earlier, in 34 the context of price-driven transactive energy demand response, any optimisation model that responds to 35 multi-service price signals could be adopted. For the case study described in Section 3 a two-stage, day-ahead 36 stochastic optimisation model, which is capable of considering multiple services, including energy arbitrage 37 and reserve/capacity services, and multiple sources of flexibility is used, and described briefly in Section 2.1. and premises level energy balances, which facilitates the modelling of virtual and physical aggregation [33] -5 see (4). As mentioned, the optimisation is a stochastic one with number of scenarios, each with probability 6 of occurrence , conducted over periods. It is a two-stage problem with the first stage decision being the 7 import and export on the day-ahead market ( , − and , + respectively) and the capacity market commitment 8 ( , ). All other decision variables are set in the second stage, including import/export on the imbalance 9 market ( , , − / , , + ) and the electricity import/export and the GCP and premises level ( ( ) , , − , ( ) , , + , 10
Regarding the capacity commitment ( , ), this attracts revenue according to the 11 availability price ( , ) during the relevant capacity windows (indicated by ), and according to the call 12 price ( , ) during the capacity calls (indicated by , ). More detail on capacity/reserve modelling can be 13 found in [37] . 
Electricity import and export at the premises level is dictated by the mappings between the premises, energy 18 conversion, storage and demand levels, the demand profiles, and the parameters of the energy conversion and 19 storage resources. Although the full model is not presented here for brevity, a key constraint to be mentioned 1 is the network constraint. As shown in (5), and in line with Figure 2 , the electricity balance at the GCP level 2 must be mapped to the physical network level using , to ensure that import/export on each network is 3 below the network limit ( 
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Focusing on a district, once the whole energy system has been described graphically, the topology can be used 1 to define matrices for mapping district cash flows (which result from the DMES model, see Section 2.1), to 2 roles, and then roles to actors. This mapping can then be used to quantify the direct and indirect effect of 3 district optimisation on all energy system actors. Equation (6) shows how the district to role map ( , ), a 4 matrix with each entry either 0 (no mapping), 1 (positive cash flow) or -1 (negative cash flow) relates district 5 cash flows ( ) to role cash flows ( ). Similarly equation (7) shows how the role to actor map ( , ), a binary 6 matrix, relates role cash flow to actor cash flow ( ). 7
2.3 Profit sharing model 8 The above defined value mapping method is suitable for defining exchanges between actors who are engaging 9 in a purely transactive fashion, without consideration of profit sharing. However, it is likely that consumers 10 within a district may choose more service-orientated relationships with a retailer and/or aggregator actor(s) 11
(whilst relationships between retailers/aggregators and other energy system actors remain transactive). The 12 framework discussed here therefore also incorporates two examples of options for profit sharing which would 13 address these two extremes (transactive and service-based), namely, consumer led and retailer-aggregator 14 led. 15
The retailer-aggregator led option is based on the standard current relationship between consumers and 16 retailers, with retailers charging consumers for electricity according to a flat retail tariff. The flat tariff (€/kWh), 17 for a particular case is calculated as in (8), where is the retailer-aggregator-district (RAD) annual cost 18 of electricity in the base case (i.e., the cost of energy at the boundary of these roles), is the district's 19 share of the additional revenue from following the considered business case, is the required retailer 20
annual profit margin and is the electricity consumption for the given case. 21
A central assumption in this method is that the retailer-aggregator requires that its profit margin from energy 22 retailing does not decline as a result of any business case. To ensure this, the retail tariff changes in response 23 to changes in demand, varying upwards or downwards to ensure that the retailer continues to collect their 24 pre-defined retail-related profit margin. In addition to variation motivated by changes in overall demand, the 25 retail tariff will also vary in order to allocate the consumer its (contractually agreed) share of the business case 26 benefits. In this way the retailer-aggregator precludes disruption to their main business (energy retail), whilst 27 both the retailer-aggregator and consumer access the benefits associated with new, flexibility-related business 28 cases. For the retailer-aggregator led case, the district revenue ( ) is a function of the calculated tariff 29 (see (8) ) and the electricity consumption (9). The retailer-aggregator revenue is a function of the retailer-30 aggregator's share of the revenue from following the considered business case ( ), the district revenue 31 and base RAD overall energy costs (10) . The net flow of profit within the district for the retailer-led case is 32 demonstrated in Figure 4 (a). 33
The consumer led option is a more radical approach, where the consumer(s) retain(s) control over the district 34 flexible plant and faces market prices, directly transposed by the retailer-aggregator from various markets. In 35 this option, all profit from flexibility exploitation accrues to the consumer. The consumer then remunerates 36 the retailer-aggregator for its role as an energy retailer and for transposing energy-related prices and, if 37 applicable, prices related to provision of any energy system services (e.g., balancing services). District revenue 38 is as calculated in (11), where is the annual revenue from the considered business case and is the 1 service fee payable to the retailer-aggregator. As shown in (12), the retailer-aggregator revenue is equal to the 2 service fee. The net flow of profit within the district for the consumer-led case is demonstrated in Figure 4 
Economic assessment 6
The economic assessment models comprise a portfolio of common CBA metrics preferred by different actors 7 for assessment of business cases. For instance, typically driven by the regulatory framework in place, network 8 operators tend to prefer investment assessment metrics, particularly the net present value (NPV) criterion 9
(measure of discounted benefits and discounted costs over the project lifetime), payback time (the period that 10 is required for the project to become profitable), and internal rate of return (IRR; the exact premium that a 11 business case is offering in exchange for all costs incurred, or, more precisely, the discount rate that renders 12 the present value of both benefits and costs the same). 13 3 Case study description 14 In this section, the use of the proposed modelling and assessment framework is exemplified below in the 15 analysis of six business cases undertaken for a French district of commercial buildings. 16 17 The district on which the business case studies are undertaken is made up of six office buildings. Annual (non-18 heat-related) electricity demand for the district is 4,800 MWh, whilst annual heat demand is 11,400 MWh. 19
The district
Electricity and heat half-hourly profiles for the district for a typical day for each season are given in Figure 5  20 and Figure 6 . Summer weekday/weekend, shoulder (spring/autumn) weekday/weekend, winter 21 weekday/weekend and "peak" seasons are considered 2 . As shown, peak electricity demand is 910 kW, whilst 22 peak heat demand is 2,150 kW. 23
The district is under common ownership and connected to the public electricity distribution network through a 24 single connection. Thus, it can be considered both physically and commercially aggregated [33] . Further, the 25 district is connected by a heat network. Heat is produced in a central heat facility by a modern and efficient 26 170kW electric heat pump (EHP; coefficient-of-performance around 4, depending on the specific conditions), 27 and a 1650kW electric boiler (assumed as 100% efficient). Further, the district includes 4400kW diesel-fired 28 2 There is distinction in the demand data between winter weekday and "peak", as this distinction is relevant to market factors rather than demand factors, see Section 3.3. electricity generation (32% efficient), thermal storage (250,000 litres hot water storage) and battery storage 1 (660kWh capacity, 180kW charge rate, 720kW discharge rate, 90% round-trip efficiency). The parameters are 2 summarised in Table I 
3). 19
Further price signals, which are considered in business case 6, are the balancing responsible entity (BRE) fee, 20 value-added-tax (VAT) and environmental and social obligations (ESO). BRE fees are required by the system 21 operator to pay for procurement of balancing services, to maintain the security of the grid. 22 Figure 8 shows price profiles, across the 48 settlement periods of the day, disaggregated by price component 24 for the seven representative days considered in this work. Note that there is no UoS component in the graphs 25 of Figure 8 as, for the tariff being considered (see Section 3.2), UoS fees are charged based on the subscribed 26 power of the user. The capacity market availability price shown in Figure 8 is set based on a capacity price of 27 €30/kW, and assumes that a capacity call is equally likely over the 15 days of the modelled peak period, and 28 the 10 hours per day in which capacity may be called. The solid lines represent the total district import/export 29 prices at the day-ahead (wholesale) stage, whilst the dotted lines represent total district import/export prices 30 for real-time transactions. 31
Price profiles 23
As mentioned earlier, business cases are measured against a baseline case, in which optimisation is conducted 32 on retail prices (although the district remunerates relevant parties according to market rates). For these cases 33 retail prices are set based on a typical tariff for large commercial users, see Table II.  34   35 3 Business cases 4 and 6 are not shown in Figure 7 as business case 4 is based on relaxing the security constraints of the optimisation, rather than a price signal, and business case 6 is the combination of all business cases. 
Other retailer
Business cases 4
In this study, six business cases (in addition to a baseline case, business case 0) are considered. These business 5 cases are pursued by the lead actor within the RAD (see Section 2.3), by controlling and optimizing the district 6 flexible plant (i.e., EHP, electric boiler, diesel electricity generator and associated thermal/electrical storage; 7 see Section 3.1), in response to the relevant price signals (see Section 3.4). The business case are described 1 below, and summarised in Table III (including explanation of the acronyms used) . 2 -Business case 0: All business cases described below are measured against this 'baseline' case, in which 3 the district optimises with respect to regular retail prices. Likely behaviour in this case, in response to 4 the retail prices detailed in Table II , will be to shift district electricity consumption away from higher 5 price import periods, using the thermal and electrical storage. As the retail prices do not directly 6 reflect wholesale electricity prices, and other price components, the benefit of this optimisation will 7 be limited. 8 -Business case 1: The first business case, namely, OPWM, is an energy-oriented business case. Here, 9 the lead actor is exposed to electricity day-ahead wholesale market prices (see Section 3.2), and 10 attempts to minimise expenditure by utilising district flexibility to shift grid electricity consumption 11 away from high price periods to low price periods, at the day-ahead stage. 12 -Business case 2: The MIP business case is a flexibility-oriented one. For this case, the lead actor 13 perceives, in addition to electricity day-ahead wholesale market prices, penalties associated with 14 imbalance, i.e., the difference between actual consumption and purchase in the wholesale market 15 (which can differ as wholesale market purchases are conducted at the day-ahead stage, and final 16 energy demand is uncertain). 17 -Business case 3: In the CM business case, which is a capacity-oriented one, the district perceives the 18 capacity price and seeks to maximise their potential electricity consumption reduction by shifting 19 consumption to periods of network stress (which may count as capacity). These are assumed to occur, 20 with equal likelihood on a "peak" day. 
Optimisation engine and assessment of the operational cash flows
33
The decision variables in the district optimisation model are the electricity/thermal generation/storage plant 34 set-points, grid electricity import/export, and, in appropriate cases, capacity provision. The main optimisation 35 seeks to minimise district energy costs/maximise revenues from services, in line with [16] , with price 36 components applied at the premises, GCP and commercial level as in [33] . The district is both (thermally and 1 electrically) physically and commercially aggregated. Focusing on the heating network and electrical premises-2 commercial agent/network mappings, aggregation matrices are set as defined in Table IV. As the district is  3 under one owner, connected to the wider electricity network via one GCP, optimised as one and situated on a 4 single electricity network, , , , and , are all 1x1 matrices. Figure 9 shows these mappings 5 graphically. 6 Each business case is evaluated for seven typical days corresponding to specific seasons and period of the 10 week, namely summer weekday/weekend, shoulder (spring/autumn) weekday/weekend, winter 11 weekday/weekend and "peak" season. The numbers of days represented by the various model days, which are 12 used to calculate annual results, are as shown in Table V . 13 Below, in Section 4.1, the RAD cash flows from the various business cases are presented and discussed. 4
Subsequently, in Section 4.2, the effect of district optimisation on the various other actors of the energy 5 system is studied in an example for the 'All' business case (optimisation on all price signals). Then in Section 6 4.3, the retail tariffs and consumer cash flow resulting from the profit sharing model are presented. Finally in 7 Section 4.4 the NPV of the various business cases are presented and discussed. 8
Business case cash flows
9 Figure 10 shows the change in cash flows associated with the various price components and the considered 10 business cases for the district, compared to the baseline retail optimisation case (see Section 3.3). As shown, 11 the OPWM and MIP business cases produce net increases in operational revenue, compared to the baseline 12 case, of €14,000/year and €20,000/year, respectively. In both cases there is increased revenue as expenditure 13 on imbalance electricity is reduced, which is tempered by an increase in expenditure on wholesale electricity. 14 The CM business case produces a much larger increase, of €202,000/year, which is almost entirely due to 15 revenue obtained from the capacity market. The change in revenue for the DNCM case is negligible, whilst the 16
UoS case produces an increase of €43,000/year, with most revenue from reduction in UoS fee costs. 
22
For the demonstrated results, a key point of note is that whilst optimisation is with respect to particular price 23 signals for each case, there can be substantial impacts on the cash flows related to other price components. 24 This observation demonstrates the importance and power of the price disaggregation and mapping 25 methodology, which enables this type of emergent system behaviour to be captured. A clear example of this 26 effect can be seen in the OPWM business case, in which the district wholesale electricity cash flow actually 27 decreases, compared to the baseline case, as total cash flow increases. This occurs because, after the business 28 case optimisation, which shifts electricity demand away from high wholesale market price periods, the 29 secondary market optimisation shifts electricity purchase away from imbalance market to the wholesale 30 market. As demand is less uncertain in cheaper periods 4 , there is more scope for the secondary optimisation to 1 increase revenue by shifting to the purchase wholesale market. This clearly demonstrates the importance of 2 the value mapping method (as well as a sophisticated district optimisation model) to enable capture of these 3 effects. 4
For the MIP business case, change in revenue compared to the baseline case is slightly larger compared to the 5 OPWM business case. The extra revenue is due to an increased shift away from high price 6 wholesale/imbalance market periods, as exposure to imbalance prices increases the expected price differential 7 between periods, particularly at weekends and in the peak season (see Figure 8 ). For the CM business case, 8 introduction of capacity price signals from the capacity market has a more significant impact, producing a large 9 increase in revenue compared to the baseline case. 64% of this revenue increase is attributable to the 10 4,400kW provided by the back-up diesel generators available in the district. The remaining 36% can be 11 attributed to the 2,500kW of capacity available from flexible electricity consumption (EHP and electric boilers) 12 and electrical battery storage (see Section 3.1). In the CM business case, there is a marginal decrease in ESO 13
and VAT cash flow compared to the baseline case, as the reward for maintaining increased electricity 14 consumption during capacity market availability periods (to increase the baseline capacity resource) motivates 15
shift from more efficient EHP to less efficient electric boilers. Although the effect is small in the case study, it 16 demonstrates, again, the type of emergent behaviour which can be of interest to affected actors and system 17 regulators/policy makers. 18
The value of the DNCM business case, which would aim at reducing net electricity demand during times of 19 network stress (e.g., times of peak electricity demand), compared to the baseline case is negligible in this 20 study. This is because the retail price signals already act to penalise any increase in net electricity demand 21 during the time of peak electricity consumption through the differential between peak and off-peak import 22
and export prices (see Table II ). Therefore the opportunity to violate N-1 distribution network capacity is not 23 useful under a cost minimisation objective. This situation may change if, under wholesale market price 24 optimisation, energy prices are so variable that they encourage a shift to low cost periods, creating a new, 25 larger peak at that time. 26
The UoS business case is expected to produce an increase in revenue compared to the baseline case, as peak 27 demand is reduced from 2710kW to 2030kW (not depicted for brevity), which reduces UoS cost. 28
Consideration of all business cases and relevant price signals results in the highest increase in revenue 29 compared to the baseline case, largely due to revenue from the capacity market. Figure 11 shows the effect of business case exploitation on the other actors in the system, informed by the 36 connections shown in Figure 7 . The 'All' price signals case is taken as an example. Figure 11 clearly 37 demonstrates the power of the mapping methodology as a tool for quantifying the impact of any transactive 38 energy business case on other system actors. Further the ability to differentiate between the cash flows from 39 different commodities/services enables actors to understand the sensitivity of their total cash flows to 40 variation in the revenue from constituent cash flow components. In the demonstrated case study, the 41 increases in operational revenue experienced by the district, compared to the baseline case, come largely at 42 the expense of the electricity producer. This is because reductions in district imbalance results in less balancing 1 electricity revenue for the electricity producer, and capacity provided by the district is assumed to be 2 abstracted from the electricity producer. The EDNO can also expect to lose (operational) revenue compared to 3 the baseline case as the district reduces its peak import (on which UoS is charged). It should be highlighted 4 that, as a regulated party with an allowed revenue set by the relevant regulator, a change in operational 5 revenue will only serve to change UoS fee structure (in future years), to ensure allowed revenue is recouped. 9 For the retailer-aggregator led option, district profit shares of 20%, 50% and 80% were considered. Figure 12  10 shows how the retail tariff varies, by district profit share and by business case, including the baseline case. As 11 shown, the tariff varies little for most cases, as the total profits from business case exploitation are low for 12 most cases, as is the change in electricity consumption (which affects the retailer profit margin, and hence the 13 tariff, as described in Section 2.3), see Figure 12 . The exceptions are the CM and 'All' cases, where the more 14 substantial revenue from flexibility exploitation results in significant profit to be shared with the consumer, 15 resulting in lowered tariffs. These cases demonstrate the ability of the profit sharing model to determine tariffs 16 which can serve to share profit between a retailer-aggregator, which is active in markets, controlling and 17 exploiting district flexibility through transactive exchanges, and the passive district consumers. A point of note 18 is the possibility of business case exploitation resulting in higher energy consumption, as flexible plant is 19 utilised to shift grid electricity consumption to lower price periods, incurring thermal/electrical losses, as 20 thermal storage and electrical batteries are utilised to achieve this. Such increases in energy consumption are 21 demonstrated in Table VI . This serves to highlight the non-equivalence of energy and cost optimisation under 22 variable prices. The resulting change in revenue for the consumer, for the various profit share options, is 23 shown in Figure 13 . 24 Also shown in Figure 13 , is the change in operational revenue for the consumer led option. In this option all 25 profit accrues to the consumer. As, in all cases, including the baseline case, the retailer service fee (see Section 26 2.3) does not change, change in district revenue is the same as the change in overall RAD revenue (see Figure  27 10). 28
Profit sharing
On the basis of these operational cash flow splits, it may be expected that the district will always favour the 29 consumer led option. However, consideration of only operational cash flows ignores other salient factors, such 30 as those relating to investment, as discussed in Section 4.4. 31 7 For the considered case study, the only investment required, for all business cases, is for enabling ICT, such as 8 communication, automation and computation devices, which provide the "smartness" required for the studied 9 business cases. No plant investment is required, as all plant was already in place in the baseline case. Given the 10 uncertainty on the level of investment required, and hence business cases, this section considers only the NPV 11 of the various business cases, without any ICT investment, for the lead actor. This provides a threshold for the 1 discounted cost of ICT investments, above which the investment can be deemed unattractive. The appropriate 2 discount rate is dependent on the riskiness of the project and the cost of capital, for the actor in question. To 3 reflect the smaller size of the district (compared to the retailer-aggregator), which results in less ability to 4 handle risk and higher cost of capital, the consumer discount rate is taken as 10%, whilst the retailer-5 aggregator discount rate is taken as 7%. 6 Figure 14 shows the NPV (without ICT investment) for the different business cases for the lead actor, for the 7 four sharing agreements considered. Given the greater operational revenues, the supremacy of the CM and 8 'All' business cases is unsurprising. Of interest, though, is that the consumer-led case has only marginally more 9 value for the consumer than the retailer-aggregator led 80% case does. This demonstrates the effect of having 10 a lower discount rate for the retailer-aggregator. Indeed, given the marginal difference between those two 11 cases, the district may well prefer to take part in a retailer-aggregator led scheme, rather than lead their own 12 scheme. This might be the case if the district is particularly risk averse, or if they find the cognitive effort or the 13 administrative burden associated with leading their own scheme excessive. This situation may be exacerbated 14 if ICT investment is substantial, particularly if the retailer-aggregator is able to exploit economies of scale to 15 buy ICT at lower prices. 16 
Economic assessment
Conclusions
19
This paper presents a novel and powerful modelling and assessment framework for assessment of business 20 cases for DMES in a transactive energy context, with especially important application to smart energy districts. 21
The framework incorporates an aggregation mapping methodology that can be incorporated into relevant 22 multi-service price-based optimisation models, with tools for dealing with the complexity of the energy system 23 and of profit sharing between commercial partners, as well as for economic assessment. The aggregation 24 mapping approach within the optimisation model provides a flexible and scalable means of modelling various 25 scenarios of physical and virtual aggregation. This may prove useful for quantifying potential benefits of 26 physical aggregation (through electricity, gas and/or heat networks, if applicable) and/or virtual aggregation 27 (through coordination of districts), for example, taking advantage of the diversity of demand, in each case. The 28 modular and extensible graphical mapping methodology enables clarity by clearly specifying the transactive 29 exchanges between actors, mitigating the complexity of energy system demand-side interventions and 30 enabling the impact of any business cases to be clearly quantified. The profit sharing model provides a tool for 31 dividing business case benefits between a retailer-aggregator and consumer, dependent on the identity of the 1 'lead' actor in exploitation of district flexibility. These features offer a concise and powerful framework which 2 enables relevant parties to understand, clearly and quantifiably, the effect on their cash flows of any business 3 case. Use of the framework is demonstrated through employment on a study of several business cases for a 4 smart energy district in the French context. The case study demonstrates both the potentially significant 5 effects of development and optimisation of smart energy districts, but also the power of the described 6 methodology to identify and present such effects with clarity. 7
The described method has significant implications as a tool for initial business case assessment for both those 8 implementing a business case, and those who may be affected by its implementation. Further, the described 9 methodology can be applied in the design of energy system regulation, and in tax regime design. With respect 10 to regulatory design, the introduced mapping method can offer a means to assess the impact on all system 11 actors of various business models. Additionally, the proposed mapping method can be useful for policymakers 12 to investigate the effect of possible feedbacks that a change in policy might produce, to reduce the likelihood 13 of perverse outcomes. Equally, an actor may employ the method to forecast whether a business model that 14 initially seems acceptable may be at risk from either changes to regulation (i.e., a "regulatory response", such 15
as UoS rate increase, in response to lower UoS fee receipts), or changes in the behaviour of a liberalised actor 16 (i.e., a "market response"). 17
Further work of interest can naturally follow from exploitation of the modular and extensible nature of the 18 value mapping approach. Extension may be vertical (to "upstream" activities, such as gas production; or 19
"downstream" to exchanges within the district), horizontal (considering other energy commodities, such as 20 fuel oils or hydrogen). Further extension may be to consider incentives for low carbon heat/electricity 21 generation, or consideration of large scale and novel, local carbon markets. Indeed investigation of exchanges 22 between the various constituent parts of the RAD (retailer, aggregator and district), under various ownership 23 scenarios, is currently being undertaken by the authors. 24
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